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INCORPORATED STATE LAW 
Radha A. Pathak† 
ABSTRACT 
In the familiar case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme 
Court held that the Constitution forbade the federal courts from 
generating a body of general common law and required them instead 
to apply state substantive law when adjudicating many common-law 
causes of action. A rich body of scholarly literature and case law has 
developed to analyze the Erie doctrine and to guide federal courts in 
interpreting and applying state law when the litigants assert causes of 
action that have their source in state law (e.g., when a federal court is 
exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction). But those are not 
the only cases that call upon federal courts to apply state law; rather, 
state law is often connected to federal law in a way that necessitates 
its adjudication in federal court. Notably, federal courts must 
interpret and apply state law that has been incorporated into federal 
statutes and federal common law. Such “incorporated” state law has 
received little attention from scholars, but it should be of significant 
interest because it arises routinely, and the federal court applying 
incorporated state law is not bound by the Erie imperative to apply 
state law accurately. This Article seeks to focus attention on the 
subject of incorporated state law and to explore the potential 
challenges that it might present. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has never been the case that the federal judiciary’s sole 
responsibility is to adjudicate questions of federal law. Federal courts 
did not enjoy general federal question jurisdiction until 1875, about 
eighty-six years after they came into existence.1 In contrast, the 
federal courts have always been empowered to adjudicate lawsuits 
between parties of diverse citizenship, even when no federal law is 
applicable.2 While the federal courts have come to be seen as essential 
                                                                                                                 
1 See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (conferring jurisdiction over 
civil suits “arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States” on “the circuit courts of 
the United States”); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & 
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing 
federal question jurisdiction). Congress briefly conferred federal question jurisdiction on the 
federal courts in section 11 of the Midnight Judges Act, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (1801), but that 
grant was repealed one year later by section 1 of the Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132, 
132. 13D WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra, § 3561, n.5. The federal courts were 
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & 
FREER, supra, § 3503 (describing the creation of the first federal courts, their organization, 
and the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
2 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred federal jurisdiction over any lawsuit in 
which one party was a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought and another party was a 
citizen of another state. Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; see also 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602 (3d 
ed. 2009) (describing the jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789). In the Judiciary 
Act of 1875, Congress conferred jurisdiction on suits between citizens of different states, or 
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to the enforcement of federal law,3 the exercise of diversity 
jurisdiction continues to be an important part of their caseload.4 In 
exercising this jurisdiction, the federal courts necessarily interpret and 
apply state law.5 
But federal courts routinely encounter state law even when 
enforcing federal law. For example, a litigant may argue that state law 
is preempted by federal law, violates the U.S. Constitution, or has 
been previously interpreted by a state court so as to bar collateral 
review of federal claims. All of these examples potentially require the 
federal courts to interpret and apply state law.6 
Much has been written about the interpretation and application of 
state law by the federal courts in these contexts. For example, rich 
academic literature7 and case law8 has developed to provide the 
federal courts with guidance in addressing state law in cases—such as 
those based on diversity jurisdiction—where litigants assert state-law 
claims.9 Similarly, much scholarship10 and litigation11 has been 
                                                                                                                 
 
“between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects,” regardless of whether the 
suit was brought in the home state of any of the parties, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. at 470, and that 
requirement has never been resurrected. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra, § 3602. 
3 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1, at 265 (4th ed. 2003) 
(“The core of modern federal court jurisdiction is cases arising under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States. Termed federal question jurisdiction, these cases comprise the largest 
component of the federal courts’ docket and are widely viewed as the most important 
component of the federal courts’ workload.”). 
4 See generally Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction 
Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992).  
5 See infra Part I.A (discussing state law that applies of its own force). 
6 See infra Part I.B (discussing “antecedent” state law). 
7 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680020 (last visited April 16, 2011); Adam N. Steinman, 
What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean For the Contemporary Politics of Judicial 
Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008); Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional 
Source, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2007); Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: 
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); John Hart Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal 
Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975 (2004); Martin H. Redish & 
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After 
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980). 
8 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) 
Gasperini v. Cent. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 
U.S. 225 (1991); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
9 Such cases are not, of course, limited to those based on diversity jurisdiction. See infra 
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devoted to the complex issues presented when the federal courts must 
address questions of state law because their resolution will affect the 
adjudication of related questions of federal law.12  
Comparatively little, however, has been written about the manner 
in which federal courts should address state law that is embedded 
within federal (nonconstitutional) law.13 That subject is the focus of 
this Article. This topic should be of significant interest because 
federal statutes and federal common law routinely (and in a wide 
range of subject areas) incorporate state law.14 And they do so for 
many purposes—for example, federal law may define a term with 
reference to state law;15 it may look to state law to provide a 
                                                                                                                 
 
notes 21–28 and accompanying text (discussing other types of cases, for example, ones in which 
supplemental jurisdiction is exercised). 
10 See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-
Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 89 (2002); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III 
and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1055 
(1999); Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. Rev. 943 (1965); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986); Michael E. 
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-first Century, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 335 (2002); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the 
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (2003). 
11 See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per 
curiam); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
12 See, e.g., infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
13 To be sure, some notable early works have addressed the subject. See, e.g., Henry J. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
410–12 (1964). See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence 
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 
(1957). In recent years, the subject has occasionally received some attention as part of important 
works addressing other subjects. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign 
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2008) (recognizing that “federal law sometimes dynamically 
incorporates state law”); id. at 125 (discussing examples of where federal law incorporates state 
law); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State 
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1935–1947 (2003) (arguing that there 
is a critical, and often misunderstood, distinction between “determining” state law as opposed to 
“characterizing” it for federal purposes). Professor Mulligan directly addresses incorporated 
state law in his analysis of federal question jurisdiction.  See Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction 
by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1748845. 
14 The U.S. Constitution also incorporates state law. For example, the Contracts Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, and the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, incorporate 
state-law concepts of contracts and property, respectively. Constitutional incorporation of state 
law is beyond the scope of this Article. 
15 See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (drawing on “the ready-
made body of state law to define the word ‘children’ in [the Copyright Act]”); Reconstr. Fin. 
Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (using state law to define the term “real 
property” in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act).  
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procedural rule;16 or it may borrow from state law a substantive rule 
of decision.17 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I rehearses the familiar 
instances where federal courts encounter state law. Part II contrasts 
these instances with circumstances in which federal 
(nonconstitutional) law borrows—i.e., incorporates—state law. Part 
III then identifies and explores the unintended consequences of 
existing doctrine regarding this incorporated state law. 
I. FAMILIAR INSTANCES WHERE FEDERAL COURTS  
ENCOUNTER STATE LAW 
A. State Law That Applies of Its Own Force (“Erie cases”) 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,18 federal courts have been required to apply state law in a 
large number of cases. While the precise holding of Erie is the subject 
of some debate,19 it is clear that, as a result of Erie and its progeny, 
the federal courts will often be required to apply state law because 
they lack the power to apply anything else. That is, in many 
situations, the source of law that governs liability in a federal court 
                                                                                                                 
16 See, e.g., N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (explaining that federal 
courts routinely borrow state statutes of limitation for federal claims); Robertson v. Wegmann, 
436 U.S. 584, 589–94 (1978) (holding that survival of a § 1983 action depends on borrowed 
state law); cf. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02, at 1-6 (3d ed. 
2010) (“In 1872, Congress passed the so-called ‘Conformity Act,’ which required that federal 
district courts conform their procedure ‘as near as may be’ with that of the state in which the 
district was located.”). 
17 See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (incorporating the criminal 
law of the state in which federal land is located); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1) (2006) (granting federal jurisdiction over tort claims against federal employees); 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006) (describing the liability of foreign 
states); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (describing 
the well-established rule that “in bankruptcy . . . state law governs the substance of claims” 
(quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
19 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 7, at 312–16 (“A final, overarching problem that has 
plagued the Erie doctrine is the source of the doctrine itself.”); Paul Lund, The Decline of 
Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911 n.54 (1996) (“[T]here is great disagreement as 
to the nature and extent of Erie’s constitutional holding.” (citing George D. Brown, Federal 
Common Law and The Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie 
Problem?, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 238–40 (1992); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of 
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384–91 (1964); Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1985); Louise 
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 811–12, 815, 819–20 (1989))). 
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will be a state sovereign. Put yet another way, state law will apply of 
its own force.20 
This category of cases is most easily associated with the exercise 
of federal diversity jurisdiction, which permits federal courts to 
adjudicate any lawsuit with complete diversity of citizenship and an 
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.21 It also includes cases 
heard pursuant to jurisdictional statutes that require only minimal 
diversity of citizenship—e.g., the Class Action Fairness Act;22 the 
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act;23 and the federal 
interpleader statute.24 
This category is not limited, however, to cases in which the federal 
adjudicatory power is ultimately based on the diversity or alienage 
clauses of Article III, Section 2.25 The exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction permits federal courts to resolve state-law claims.26 
Specific grants of federal question jurisdiction also sweep state-
created causes of action within the federal judicial power—e.g., 
federal courts are permitted to hear any “civil proceedings” that are 
“related to” a bankruptcy case.27 And federal courts will sometimes 
have federal question jurisdiction over a state-law cause of action that 
has a federal issue embedded within it.28 
Before Erie, the federal courts were permitted to craft their own 
common-law rules when adjudicating disputes in which no federal or 
                                                                                                                 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592–93 (1973) 
(using the phrase “state law govern[s] of its own force” to describe cases where Erie requires 
the federal court to apply state law). 
21 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
22 Id. § 1332(d). 
23 Id. § 1369. 
24 Id. § 1335. 
25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of 
different States, . . . and between . . . the Citizens [of a State], and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.”). 
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. If a cause of action is part of the same “case or controversy” as a 
claim that falls within the federal court’s original jurisdiction, then the cause of action may be 
heard by the federal court, even if the claim could not be heard in federal court if it were 
asserted alone. Cf. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1, 
543 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that Erie requires the application of state law to an unfair-
competition claim of which the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(b), which “confers jurisdiction of ‘a claim of unfair competition when joined with a 
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, or trade-mark laws’”). 
27 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). These often involve causes of action that are created by state, 
rather than federal, law. See, e.g., Radha A. Pathak, Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule”: Federal 
Courts, Article I, and the Problem of “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 85 OR. L. REV. 59 
(2006) (discussing the broad scope of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction). 
28 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 
(2005); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
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state statute governed.29 The Rules of Decision Act required the 
federal courts to apply the “laws of the several states” as the “rules of 
decision” in the absence of federal law.30 But the Supreme Court in 
Swift v. Tyson31 interpreted the term “laws” to mean state statutes and 
state judicial opinions interpreting those statutes, as well as state 
judicial opinions concerning “real estate, and other matters 
immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character.”32 
Moreover, “laws” excluded state judicial opinions regarding legal 
issues “of a more general nature,”33 such as contract law or 
commercial law.34 Tort law also came within the purview of general 
law.35 As a result, when Harry Tompkins sued Erie Railroad 
Company after he was injured by a passing train,36 the federal trial 
court did not consider itself bound by the standard of liability that the 
Pennsylvania state court would have applied to the railroad’s 
conduct.37 
The facts of Erie are familiar: Tompkins was walking along a path 
that ran closely parallel to the railroad tracks.38 As the train passed 
him, he was struck by an object protruding from the train. He fell to 
the ground and his right arm was severed by the wheels of the train.39 
According to the defendant-railroad, the Pennsylvania courts would 
have considered Tompkins to be a trespasser and hence entitled only 
to protection from the railroad’s willful and wanton misconduct.40 
Other jurisdictions would have considered Tompkins to be a licensee 
and hence entitled to a standard of ordinary care.41 The federal trial 
                                                                                                                 
29 See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts were 
free to develop federal common law), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
30 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
31 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1. 
32 Id. at 18. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4502 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing what “general law” was held to 
encompass). 
36 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 69 (describing facts and suit in federal district court in New 
York); Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 603–04 (2d Cir. 1937) (describing facts in more 
detail). 
37 Erie, 304 U.S. at 70; Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604. 
38 Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 603–04 (describing the location of the accident in detail). 
39 Id. at 604 (“[As the train passed Tompkins,] ‘a black object that looked like a door’ 
loomed up in front. Before he could even raise his hands, he was struck on the head and thrown 
to the ground in such a way that his right arm came under the wheels of the train.”). 
40 Erie, 304 U.S. at 70; Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604. 
41 See Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (citing cases from various jurisdictions in favor of its 
conclusion that Erie Railroad owed Tompkins a duty of reasonable care). 
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court adopted the ordinary-care approach.42 Citing Swift, the court of 
appeals affirmed: the proper standard of care to be exercised by a 
railroad was a question of general law. Thus the federal trial court 
was not required to determine the content of Pennsylvania law, but 
rather was permitted to “exercise [its] independent judgment” as to 
the issue.43 
The Supreme Court reversed,44 stating, “Except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law 
to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”45 It is clear today 
that the quoted sentence is not literally true—the U.S. Constitution, 
federal statutes, and state law are not the only three sources of law 
that a federal court is permitted to apply to resolve disputes. Even 
though “[t]here is no federal general common law,”46 there is some 
federal common law. But it is equally clear that the Supreme Court in 
Erie was denying the federal court’s power to craft a common-law 
rule to apply in Tompkins’s case against Erie Railroad. And since 
Erie, there have been two lines of cases in which the Supreme Court 
has grappled with the question of whether the federal courts are 
required to apply state law because they lack the power to apply 
anything else. That is, there are two lines of cases in which the federal 
courts have been prohibited from crafting common-law rules to apply 
to a situation where no other source of federal law applies. 
The first line of cases is the Erie line: for example, Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York,47 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,48 
Hanna v. Plumer,49 and Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.50 
York and Gasperini required the federal courts to apply state law: the 
                                                                                                                 
42 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70 (noting that, in response to the defendant’s argument that under 
Pennsylvania law Tompkins should be considered a trespasser, “[t]he trial judge refused to rule 
that the applicable law precluded recovery”); Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (“[U]pon questions of 
general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent 
judgment as to what the law is; and it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of a 
railroad for injuries caused by its servants is one of general law.” (citing Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. 
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893); Redfield v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 83 F.2d 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1936); 
Cole v. Pa. R.R. Co., 43 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1930))). 
43 Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604. 
44 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. 
45 Id. at 78. 
46 Id. 
47 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
48 356 U.S. 525 (1958).  
49 380 U.S. 460, 465–68 (1965) (explaining that, even if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 
did not govern the issue at hand, the federal court would be required to apply state rules of 
service only if doing otherwise would lead to “forum-shopping” or “inequitable administration 
of the laws”). 
50 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
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state statute of limitations51 and the state standard for determining 
whether a jury’s award of damages was excessive,52 respectively. 
More specifically, the federal courts were required to apply state law 
instead of federal common law: the federal common law of laches and 
the federal “shocks the conscience” standard for determining whether 
a jury verdict was excessive. Even cases like Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp.53 can be viewed in this way: the Court, after determining that 
no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was applicable, further held—
only after a consideration of the “twin aims” of Erie—that the federal 
court was required to apply state tolling law.54 Implicit in this analysis 
is the conclusion that the federal court was not empowered in that 
particular case to craft a common-law rule regarding the tolling of the 
statute of limitations.  
The second relevant line of cases concerns federal common law: 
cases such as Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass’n v. 
Parnell55 and Miree v. DeKalb County.56 In these cases, the Supreme 
Court found that the federal courts lacked the authority to craft a 
common-law rule.57 In Parnell, one private party (a bank) sued other 
private parties (individuals and banks) for conversion of federal 
bonds.58 The trial court applied state law to the issue of whether the 
defendants took the bonds in good faith, but the Third Circuit 
reversed, holding that federal common law governed the dispute.59 
The Supreme Court disagreed, distinguishing the case from Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States,60 where it had held that federal common 
law governed a suit by the United States against a private party to 
recover the value of a forged government check.61 The dispute in 
Parnell, the Court declared, did “not touch the rights and duties of the 
United States” and thus did not “justify the application of federal law 
to transactions essentially of local concern.”62 
                                                                                                                 
51 See York, 326 U.S. at 108–10 (holding that federal court was required to apply New 
York’s statute of limitations, rather than the doctrine of laches). 
52 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428–31 (holding that New York’s “deviates materially” 
standard for determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict would apply in a diversity case, 
rather than the federal “shocks the conscience” standard). 
53 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
54 Id. at 752–53. 
55 352 U.S. 29 (1956). 
56 433 U.S. 25 (1977). 
57 See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (vacating the Fifth 
Circuit’s judgment because state law, not federal law, should govern a leasing-contract case). 
58 Parnell, 352 U.S. at 30. 
59 Id. at 31–33. 
60 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
61 Id. at 366–67. 
62 Parnell, 352 U.S. at 33–34. 
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In Miree, victims of an airplane crash at the DeKalb-Peachtree 
Airport sued DeKalb County as third-party beneficiaries of contracts 
between DeKalb County and the Federal Aviation Administration.63 
The court of appeals applied federal common law to a particular issue 
of contract law,64 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
federal court lacked the power to create a federal common-law rule to 
govern the particular issue and thus Georgia law applied.65 It was 
clear from Miree that the refusal to allow the federal court to create 
federal common law necessarily meant that state law would apply 
because of Erie.66 Of course, there are a number of cases in which the 
Court has determined that federal courts do have the power to create 
federal common law.67 Taken as a whole, these cases are important 
building blocks in the wall that divides instances in which the federal 
court has the power to craft a common-law rule from the instances in 
which the federal court must instead apply state law. 
Within the category of cases where a federal court is required to 
apply state law, it is well established that the federal court must apply 
the state law “accurately.” To the extent that state law is clearly 
established by the highest court of the state, the federal court must 
follow it, rather than substituting its own judgment regarding what the 
state law should be. Support for this proposition can be found in Erie 
itself, and it was made explicit just one year after Erie, in Wichita 
Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls.68 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
63 Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1977). 
64 See id. at 27–28 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc applied federal 
common law to the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue as third-party 
beneficiaries of the contracts). 
65 Id. at 28–33. 
66 See id. at 28 (“[T]he case would unquestionably be governed by Georgia law, but for 
the fact that the United States is a party to the contracts in question, entered into pursuant to 
federal statute.” (internal citation omitted) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938))); see also id. at 35 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (explaining that the case should be 
resolved under Georgia law because “the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins applies” (citation 
omitted)). The Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 & n.22 (1979), 
seemed to cite Miree for the proposition that state law was adopted as a matter of federal 
common law, but it did not explain why it characterized Miree that way. Miree is more 
accurately viewed as a case where the federal court was required to apply state law because it 
lacked the power to apply anything else, rather than as a case where “state law [was] 
incorporated as the federal rule of decision.” Id. at 728.  
67  E.g. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
68 306 U.S. 103 (1939). The procedural route by which this case reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court was somewhat unique. The lawsuit was filed in Texas state court, and the state 
trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendant’s crossclaim. Id. at 104–
05. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded with a statement of the applicable 
principles of law to guide the trial court. The case was subsequently removed to federal district 
court. Id. at 105. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with 
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Court has reaffirmed the rule of Wichita Royalty on several 
occasions.69 
Although the foregoing proposition is well settled, it is of limited 
utility because there is only a narrow category of cases where state 
high court precedent can be applied in an entirely uncontroversial 
manner, such that any court—state or federal—will reach the same 
conclusion. This is true for several reasons. Broadly speaking, it is 
often necessary for a court to exercise judgment in deciding how any 
rule—even one that has been clearly articulated—should apply to a 
particular set of facts. In the Erie context, this uncertainty may be 
compounded in multiple ways. First, as the facts of a given case bear 
less and less resemblance to the salient facts of a state high court 
opinion, a rule of law announced by that opinion will appear to be 
less and less “clearly established.” Second, there may be reason to 
doubt the force of a state high court precedent if sufficient time has 
passed. Finally, there will be cases where there simply is no directly 
applicable state high court precedent. 
Much has been written about how a federal court should ascertain 
the content of state law in the absence of a clearly established rule 
announced by the highest state court.70 In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
instructions to guide the district court on the principles of law the court of appeals thought 
applicable. The principles contravened those provided by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 106. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, pronouncing, “It was the duty of the federal 
court to apply the law of Texas as declared by its highest court.” Id. at 107 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. 
64). Although the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that Texas law permitted 
the federal court to “depart from the earlier rulings to the extent that . . . later opinions of the 
Texas Supreme Court showed that it had modified its opinion on the first appeal,” id., the Court 
did not believe there had been any such modification. Id. at 109. The Supreme Court thus 
required the district court on remand to follow the Texas Supreme Court’s instructions. Id. at 
110. 
69 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1956) (holding 
that state law regarding revocation of an arbitration clause should be governed by a forty-six-
year-old Vermont Supreme Court case, where “it was agreed on oral argument that there is no 
later authority from the Vermont courts, that no fracture in the rules announced in those cases 
has appeared in subsequent rulings or dicta, and that no legislative movement is under way in 
Vermont to change the result of those cases”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 
(1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has 
spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law unless it has 
later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or 
restricted.” (citing Wichita Royalty, 306 U.S. at 107)); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 
169, 177 (1940) (“The highest state court is the final authority on state law . . . .” (citing Beals v. 
Hale, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 37, 54 (1846); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)). 
70 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects 
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining 
the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1459 (1997); Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L. J. 762 (1941); 
Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651 (1995); Benjamin C. 
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Field,71 the Supreme Court appeared to announce a rule that federal 
courts are bound by the decisions of intermediate state appellate 
courts.72 In West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,73 
however, which the Supreme Court decided on the same day as 
Fidelity Union, the Court clarified that a federal court should defer 
to—but not be controlled by—the opinion of a state intermediate 
appellate court.74 And in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,75 the Court 
made clear “that while the decrees of ‘lower state courts’ should be 
‘attributed some weight . . . the decision [is] not controlling . . .’ 
where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point.”76 
Thus, in cases of “open” state law, federal courts will attempt to 
predict what the highest state court would say about the question.77 
B. State Law That Is Antecedent to Federal Law 
The foregoing discussion is limited to those cases in which federal 
courts encounter state law that applies of its own force. Even when 
enforcing federal law, however, the federal courts routinely encounter 
                                                                                                                 
 
Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237 (2005); Philip B. 
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 
67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to 
Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003); Nash, supra note 7; Geri J. 
Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1988). 
71 311 U.S. 169 (1940). 
72 See id. at 178–79 (“We have held that the decision of the Supreme Court upon the 
construction of a state statute should be followed in the absence of an expression of a 
countervailing view by the State’s highest court and we think that the decisions of the Court of 
Chancery are entitled to like respect as announcing the law of the State.” (citations omitted)). 
But see id. at 177–78 (“An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is 
acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence 
of what the state law is, should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question.” 
(emphasis added)). 
73 311 U.S. 223 (1940). 
74 See id. at 237 (“Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered 
judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law 
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data 
that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” (citing Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint 
Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co., 311 U.S. at 169)). 
75 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
76 Id. at 465 (omissions and alteration in original) (quoting King v. Order of United 
Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1948)). Bosch was not an Erie case—to 
the contrary, it was an incorporated state law case, but the Court appeared to be announcing 
principles that are relevant to the Erie obligation. 
77 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 172 (1942) (“When state law has not been 
authoritatively declared . . . it is [a federal court’s duty] to ascertain from all available data what 
the highest court of the state will probably hold the state law to be.” (citing West, 311 U.S. 223; 
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103 (1939))); see also Dorf, 
supra note 70, at 695 n.151 (collecting cases). 
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state law—for example, a litigant may argue that state law is 
preempted by federal law, violates the U.S. Constitution, or has been 
previously interpreted by a state court so as to bar collateral review of 
federal claims. All of these examples may require the federal courts to 
interpret and apply state law. Because the federal-law questions in 
such cases cannot be addressed until the meaning (and, perhaps, 
significance) of state law has been determined, the state law in this 
context can be described as “antecedent” to federal law. 
When encountering antecedent questions of state law, the federal 
courts often have little or no difficulty ascertaining the meaning and 
scope of such law. Consider, for example, a case that alleges that state 
law violates federal law.78 As a preliminary matter, it is certainly 
necessary to understand the challenged state law. The meaning and 
scope of such law, however, is frequently beyond dispute. Such is 
true whether the federal challenge is initially commenced in state79 or 
federal80 court. 
There are many cases, however, where questions of antecedent 
state law have vexed the federal courts.81 In particular, two categories 
of cases have engendered a substantial body of scholarship and case 
law: (i) U.S. Supreme Court review of a state court’s interpretation of 
federal law where the state court’s decision arguably relied on an 
“independent and adequate” state-law ground,82 and (ii) federal-court 
                                                                                                                 
78 Such a challenge could take several forms. For example, a litigant could argue that the 
state law violates the  U.S. Constitution. Alternatively, a litigant could argue that the state law is 
preempted by a federal statute. 
79 If the challenge is commenced in state court, the federal courts become involved only if 
the U.S. Supreme Court conducts appellate review of the state-court judgment. As such, no 
federal court is necessarily required to directly ascertain the content of state law. Rather, the 
preceding state-court decisions are likely to have defined the content of the state law; the 
Supreme Court need only decide whether it will accept the state courts’ representations about 
their own law. 
80 If the challenge is commenced in federal court, the federal courts must independently 
determine the content of state law before deciding whether it is illegitimate. The federal court 
may, however, have a definitive pronouncement about the meaning of the state law, issued by 
the highest state court. Even without such a definitive pronouncement, the relevant meaning of 
the challenged state law may be beyond dispute. State law may, for example, explicitly treat 
men and women differently, and so the federal court’s focus will be on the question of whether 
such differential treatment violates the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the sale of nonintoxicating beer to males of a 
certain age, but not females, violated the Equal Protection Clause). In such a case, it may not 
even be apparent that the federal court is in fact deciding an issue of state law. 
81  See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); 
James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). 
82 The doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds bars the U.S. Supreme Court 
from reviewing a state court’s determination of federal law if the judgment can be affirmed on 
the basis of “a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to 
support the judgment. This rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or 
procedural.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (citations omitted). “In the 
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habeas review of a state-court conviction where a state court has 
already held that the federal claim was waived because the litigant has 
violated state procedural law in presenting the federal claim.83 Put 
simply, both of these categories involve prior state-court 
determinations regarding state law that may bar entirely consideration 
of a federal claim by the federal courts. 
In both of these contexts, the Supreme Court has adopted an 
important presumption in order to address whether the prior state-
court ruling relied on an “independent” state-law ground. In Michigan 
v. Long,84 the Court adopted a “‘plain statement’ rule,” holding that a 
federal court has jurisdiction to review a state-court judgment unless 
the state court clearly expressed reliance on an adequate and 
independent state-law ground.85 In Harris v. Reed,86 the Court 
extended that rule to the federal habeas context.87 As a justification 
                                                                                                                 
 
context of direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and adequate state ground 
doctrine is jurisdictional.” Id.; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) 
(describing as “settled” the “rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two 
grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if 
the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the 
judgment.”). 
83 A federal habeas court will not review a state-court judgment for violations of federal 
law if the state court rejected the federal claim on state procedural grounds. E.g., Coleman, 501 
U.S. at 729–30 (“We have applied the doctrine of independent and adequate state ground 
doctrine not only in our own review of state court judgments, but in deciding whether federal 
district courts should address the claims of state prisoners in habeas corpus actions. The doctrine 
applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims 
because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.”). Procedural default is 
not jurisdictional, e.g., Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (“[I]n the habeas context, a 
procedural default, that is, a critical failure to comply with state procedural law, is not a 
jurisdictional matter.”), but it is functionally equivalent to the independent-and-adequate-state-
grounds doctrine: before a federal court can reach the federal questions presented by a petition 
for the writ of habeas corpus, the federal court must determine whether it will second-guess the 
state court’s determination of state law, specifically state procedural law regarding the 
presentation of federal claims to a state court. Like the independent-and-adequate-state-grounds 
doctrine, the doctrine of procedural default does not require the federal court to determine for 
itself whether the state procedural rule should be applied in a particular way: the federal court 
will refuse to entertain the claim only if the state court explicitly rules that the claim fails on the 
basis of state procedural grounds. 
84 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
85 Id. at 1042 & n.7.  
86 489 U.S. 255 (1989). 
87 See id. at 263 (“Faced with a common problem, we adopt a common solution: a 
procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review 
unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘“clearly and expressly”’ states that 
its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 
327 (1985))).  
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for this presumption, the Supreme Court has expressly articulated a 
desire to defer to the determination of state law by state courts.88 
If a state court expressly states that its judgment rests on state-law 
grounds, the federal courts may nonetheless find that the 
“independent” state-law ground was “inadequate” to prevent federal 
review of the federal claims presented by the case. As Professor 
Meltzer has noted, “[i]t is not easy to categorize” the various 
instances in which state law is labeled “inadequate.”89 Drawing on 
Professor Meltzer’s description of “four overlapping themes,”90 
Professor Struve has identified two principles that underlie the 
instances in which state law is deemed inadequate. 
First, state procedural law will be considered inadequate if it 
undermines the “supremacy rationale,” which can be understood as 
the federal interest in enforcing federal law.91 There is no serious 
argument that cases involving the supremacy rationale are cases in 
which the federal court is second-guessing a state court’s 
determination of state law. Rather, the federal court is simply holding 
that the existence of an independent state-law ground for the decision 
will not bar federal review in this case because to hold otherwise 
would undermine federal interests.92 
The second group of cases in which state grounds are considered 
“inadequate” are those in which the federal court has process-based 
concerns about the state law. For example, the Supreme Court has 
identified a state procedural basis for decision as inadequate if the 
procedural requirement is “novel” or inconsistently imposed.93 These 
cases do begin to raise the question of whether the Supreme Court is 
refusing to defer to determinations of state law by state courts, 
because the Court speaks in terms of honoring only those state-law 
                                                                                                                 
88 See, e.g., id. at 264 (“Requiring a state court to be explicit in its reliance on a procedural 
default does not interfere unduly with state judicial decisionmaking. As Long itself recognized, 
it would be more intrusive for a federal court to second-guess a state court’s determination of 
state law.” (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1041)).  
89 Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1137. 
90 Id. at 1138. 
91 See Struve, supra note 10, at 252.  
92 Indeed, the issue can be cast as one of preemption. In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 
137–38 (1988), the state court had denied the plaintiff’s federal claim on the basis of a state 
procedural requirement (a notice of claim provision). The Supreme Court reached the federal 
claim despite the existence of an independent state procedural ground that could sustain the 
outcome in the state court. In doing so, the Court explained that the state procedural requirement 
“conflict[ed] in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983” and was 
thus preempted. Id. at 138. 
93 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1969) (noting 
proper federal jurisdiction because inconsistent application of a state notice requirement by the 
state court made the procedural basis for decision discretionary rather than jurisdictional). 
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grounds that have “fair or substantial support.”94 But even in these 
cases, the concern is misplaced: the Supreme Court is not telling the 
state court that its interpretation or application of state law was wrong 
as a matter of state law. Rather, the Court is simply determining that 
certain state laws—because of the manner in which they are 
administered—will not bar federal review of a state court’s 
adjudication of federal claims. Thus, even the process-based 
inadequacy cases demonstrate the high level of deference that federal 
courts give to state-court determinations regarding the meaning of 
state law. 
II. FEDERALIZING STATE LAW THROUGH INCORPORATION 
In contrast to situations where only state law is applicable to a 
claim or where a claim presents an issue of state law that is 
antecedent to federal law, federal courts also confront claims in which 
state law has been intertwined with federal law. Any type of federal 
law—constitutional, statutory, or judicial—can borrow state law, and 
state law can be borrowed for either substantive or procedural 
purposes. In these cases of incorporated state law, the source of the 
right sued upon is federal,95 and state law forms one part—either 
substantive or procedural—of the federal cause of action. State law is 
applied not because the federal court lacks the power to apply 
anything else, but rather because the relevant federal rule maker—
e.g., Congress or the federal court—made a choice to have state law 
applied.96 The rule maker could have chosen to create a uniform 
federal rule but it instead decided to adopt a rule from state law. As a 
formal matter, therefore, the borrowed state law is actually federal 
law.97  
                                                                                                                 
94 Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958). 
95 See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349, 352 (1939) 
(recognizing, in a case brought by the United States to recover taxes from a county in Kansas on 
behalf of a woman of Pottawatomie descent, that federal law—in particular a treaty—is the 
“origin of the right to be enforced,” and that the “source of the right” is federal, rather than state, 
law). 
96 See id. at 351–52 (“With reference to other federal rights, the state law has been 
absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of the 
right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal 
policy.”). 
97 See id. at 349–50 (“Since the origin of the right to be enforced is the Treaty [between 
the United States and the Pottawatomie Nation of Indians], plainly whatever rule we fashion is 
ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, and does not 
owe its authority to the law-making agencies of Kansas.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938))); see also Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign 
Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1785 (2007) (“When a court 
‘adopts’ a state rule of decision as part of federal law, the resulting rule is federal in character.”). 
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Section A will discuss a few illustrative examples of the wide 
variety of circumstances in which federal law borrows state law. 
Section B will then describe the relevant doctrinal landscape 
governing the treatment of “state law” in this category of cases. 
A. Illustrative Examples 
1. State Law Incorporated into a Federal Statute 
Congress can explicitly incorporate state law into a federal 
statute.98 For example, Congress in the Federal Tort Claims Act 
created a private right of action for persons injured by the tortious 
conduct of any employee of the federal government99 and instructed 
that the federal government would be held liable “under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred.”100 Thus, the federal statute both created 
the private right of action and also incorporated state law as the 
substantive law governing the cause of action. State law does not 
govern every aspect of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
Nonetheless, important aspects of any claim brought under the Act 
are governed entirely by state law. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act101 operates much in the 
same way as the Federal Tort Claims Act. Foreign governments can 
be held liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances.”102 Again, state law is not 
entirely applicable because federal law governs the availability of a 
sovereign immunity defense,103 and federal law also prohibits the 
award of punitive damages against the foreign government.104 
                                                                                                                 
98 Throughout this Article, references to “state law” contemplate the law of a particular 
state, rather than the laws of the several states. Congress can of course decide to craft a federal 
rule by looking to the collective wisdom of the states as a whole, but that type of state law is not 
the subject of this Article.  
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on 
and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment . . . .”). 
100 Id. 
101 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). 
102 Id. § 1606 (2006). 
103 See id. §§ 1602–1605, 1607 (providing and defining the limits of the sovereign 
immunity defense). 
104 Id. § 1606. 
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Another example of a federal statute that borrows from state law is 
42 U.S.C. § 1988. This statute explicitly incorporates state law for 
various federal civil rights actions when federal law is “not adapted to 
the object [of protecting all persons of the United States in their civil 
rights], or [is] deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable 
remedies and punish offenses against law.”105 
Even when Congress has not explicitly incorporated state law, 
federal courts may use state law to give meaning to a federal statute. 
For example, a term in a federal statute may be given a state-law 
definition. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,106 the 
Supreme Court held that state law defined the term “real property” as 
used in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act.107 A federal 
statute provided that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) 
and its subsidiaries would be partially immune from state and local 
taxes, but that their “real property” would be subject to such taxes.108 
Beaver County in Pennsylvania assessed a tax on the machinery of an 
RFC subsidiary because Pennsylvania tax law provided that such 
machinery was real property.109 The Supreme Court held that the tax 
was proper. The federal statute did not define the term; there was no 
“decisive piece of evidence as to congressional intent”;110 and 
“congressional purpose [was] best . . . accomplished by application of 
settled state rules as to what constitutes ‘real property.’”111 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court held in De Sylva v. Ballentine112 that state law 
defined the word “children” used in the Copyright Act.113 The 
question before the Court was whether an illegitimate child was 
entitled to renewal rights, which the Copyright Act granted to 
“children.”114 
Of course, the federal court may borrow state law to do more than 
simply define a term within the federal statute. For example, the 
Supreme Court has held that a county can be held liable under 42 
                                                                                                                 
105 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
106 328 U.S. 204 (1946).  
107 Id. at 210.  
108 Id. at 206 (quoting Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 610 
(1940) (repealed 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109 Id. at 208 (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held earlier in this case that the 
machinery at issue was real property under settled Pennsylvania law). 
110 Id. at 208. 
111 Id. at 210. 
112 351 U.S. 570 (1956). 
113 Id. at 580–81 (“We think it proper, therefore, to draw on the ready-made body of state 
law to define the word ‘children’ in § 24 [of the Copyright Act].”). 
114 See id. at 580 (“We come, then, to the question of whether an illegitimate child is 
included within the term ‘children’ as used in § 24.”). 
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U.S.C. § 1983 for an individual’s behavior only if that individual is a 
“policymaker” for the county, and the Court determines whether a 
person is a “policymaker” by looking to state law.115 Additionally, the 
Bankruptcy Code looks to state law to determine whether a creditor 
has a claim against the debtor: “the ‘basic federal rule’ in bankruptcy 
is that state law governs the substance of claims.”116 
2. Incorporation as a Matter of Federal Common Law 
In addition to being incorporated into federal statutes, state law is 
also often incorporated into federal common law. For example, 
federal courts sometimes use state law to fill a gap in a federal statute. 
It should be acknowledged that such gap-filling is conceived by some 
as the creation of federal common law and by others as statutory 
interpretation. But even those who resist the federal-common-law 
label should be comfortable with the discussion that follows.117 
A well-known example of gap filling is the adoption of state 
statutes of limitations for federally created causes of action.118 Federal 
statutes often fail to specify the statute of limitations for explicitly 
created causes of action,119 and the courts must determine the 
                                                                                                                 
115 See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (“[O]ur inquiry [of whether 
the sheriff was a final policymaker] is dependent on an analysis of state law.” (citing Jett v. 
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1997); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 
(1986) (plurality opinion))). 
116 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (quoting 
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1979) (“The essential point is that in a properly 
administered scheme in which the basic federal rule is that state law governs, the primary reason 
why any holder of a mortgage may fail to collect rent immediately after default must stem from 
state law.”); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) 
(“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time a 
petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of overruling federal law, is to 
be determined by reference to state law.” (citing Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153–
54 (1928); Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 214 U.S. 279, 290–91 (1909))). 
117 The label of federal common law could be eliminated in favor of statutory interpretation 
and the basic points made in the Article would remain the same. The only significance of the 
debate, such as it is, over the legitimacy of federal common law is as follows: if federal common 
law is generally illegitimate because federal courts should not be “making law,” then perhaps a 
federal court’s choice to adopt state law is slightly more palatable than the creation of a uniform 
federal rule, because the federal court is not creating a new rule of law, but rather is relying on 
the rules formulated by legitimate (state) lawmakers. On the other hand, even a more palatable 
version of an illegitimate enterprise should be considered illegitimate.  
118 This exercise has consumed a considerable amount of time of courts and scholars. See, 
e.g., Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using 
Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress’s Residual Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE 
L.J. 393, 393–94, 397–98 (1997) (describing briefly the judicial and academic frustration with 
the process of supplying absent statutes of limitations). 
119 See, e.g., Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004) (“Like many 
federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations.”); N. Star Steel Co. 
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appropriate statute of limitations for implied private rights of action. 
In 1990, Congress enacted a generally applicable four-year statute of 
limitations,120 but the catchall statute does not govern statutory causes 
of action that existed before December 1, 1990.121 The default rule for 
those claims is that federal courts should adopt “the most closely 
analogous state limitations period” for the federal cause of action.122 
Statutes of limitations in other federal statutes may fill the gap, but 
states are “the lender of first resort.”123 
Similarly, federal courts may borrow state law when engaging in 
exercises of federal common law making that are farther from the line 
of statutory interpretation. In the seminal federal common-law case of 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the Court recognized, “In our 
choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected 
state law.”124 
B. The Doctrinal Landscape of Incorporated State Law 
Unlike state law that applies of its own force, state law applies in 
the incorporated context as a matter of federal choice. That is, a 
federal decision maker—Congress or the federal judiciary—decides 
to adopt state law as a component of federal law. To be clear, that 
same decision maker is authorized to create federal law, and so it can 
legitimately choose to create a uniform federal rule to govern a 
particular issue, for example the standards by which the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 
v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (“A look at this Court’s docket in recent years will show 
how often federal statutes fail to provide any limitations period for the causes of action they 
create . . . .”); Mikva & Pfander, supra note 118, at 393 (“Such congressional omissions have 
occurred with monotonous regularity and frequently confound the judicial branch . . . .”). 
120 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action 
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990] may not be commenced later 
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”). 
121 Section 1658(a) obviously applies to causes of action contained within entirely new 
statutes. The courts of appeals, however, were divided as to how to handle causes of action 
based on post–December 1, 1990, amendments to statutes enacted before that date. See Jones, 
541 U.S. at 374–75 (citing cases illustrating the circuit split). The Court in Jones held that the 
four-year period in § 1658 applies “if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made 
possible by a post-1990 enactment.” Id. at 382. It is unclear whether the Court’s rule extends to 
implied private rights of action. 
122 Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 
U.S. 409, 415 (2005) (holding that the express statute of limitations in the False Claims Act 
does not govern retaliation claims and remanding for consideration of which state statute of 
limitations should be borrowed). 
123 N. Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 33–34 (“Although these examples show borrowing from 
federal law as well as state, our practice has left no doubt about the lender of first resort.”). 
124 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 
(1941)). 
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can be held liable in tort. Instead of creating such a uniform federal 
rule, however, the federal decision maker chooses to borrow state law 
to govern the particular issue. And when the federal decision maker 
does so, the state law is—as a formal matter—no longer state law but 
rather federal law. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the federal nature of 
incorporated state law.125 In 1939, the Court in Board of County 
Commissioners v. United States,126 spoke of “absorb[ing]” state law 
“as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of 
the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed 
inconsistent with federal policy.”127 In United States v. Brosnan,128 
the Court again spoke in terms of “adopt[ing] as federal law state law 
governing divestiture of federal tax liens.”129 And in United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, Inc.,130 the Court spoke of incorporating state law “as 
the federal rule of decision.”131 On the other hand, there is some 
ambiguity regarding the principle. The Court in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.132 spoke disparagingly of the “borrow or 
incorporate or adopt” language,133 and questioned “the distinction 
between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law’s 
                                                                                                                 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1973); 
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947) (“[R]ights, interests and 
legal relations of the United States are determined by application of state law, where Congress 
has not acted specifically.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939) 
(“In the absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state interests, we draw upon a 
general principal that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to have a privileged position over 
other aggrieved tax-payers in their relation with the states or their political subdivisions.”); cf. 
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (starting from the proposition that “[t]he rights and duties of 
the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by” federal common law 
rather than Erie). 
126 308 U.S. 343 (1939). 
127 Id. at 351–52 (citing Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); Seaboard Air Line 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923)). 
128 363 U.S. 237 (1960). 
129 Id. at 241. 
130 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
131 Id. at 728 (“Undoubtedly, federal programs that ‘by their nature are and must be 
uniform in character throughout the Nation’ necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules. 
Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be 
incorporated as the federal rule of decision.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)) (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972); 
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943))). 
132 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
133 Id. at 507 n.3 (“Some of our cases appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal 
interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law, with federal law deigning to ‘borro[w]’ 
or ‘incorporat[e]’ or ‘adopt’ state law except where a significant conflict with federal policy 
exists.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere 
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594 (1973); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–30)).  
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incorporation of state law,” wondering whether such a distinction 
“ever makes a practical difference.”134 Justice Scalia authored the 
opinion in Boyle, and he had elsewhere argued that when state 
statutes of limitations were originally applied to federal causes of 
action, the state law was not borrowed as a matter of federal law, but 
rather applied of its own force.135 At the same time, however, he 
acknowledged that “a different historical practice had . . . 
intervened,”136 thereby suggesting that state statute of limitations were 
now indeed borrowed only as a matter of federal law. It is unclear 
whether Justice Scalia in Boyle was attempting to resurrect the 
argument that he had seemed to concede earlier, but there is at least 
the possibility that he was. Moreover, there is some reason to believe, 
in light of the opinion in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. 
McVeigh,137 that a majority of the Court in 2006 agreed.138  
Regardless of whether there has been erosion of the principle in 
the context of federal common law, it is obvious that state law applies 
only as a matter of federal law when it is incorporated into a federal 
statute. Where Congress is legitimately exercising its legislative 
authority, it is constrained by the Constitution as to the content of the 
federal law, but there is no constitutional provision that will require 
Congress to use state law to give content to federal law. The 
Constitution certainly reserves some areas of legislation to the states, 
but once Congress has the constitutional green light to legislate in a 
particular area, it is free to depart entirely from any state law in the 
same area. Thus, if Congress adopts state law, it does so entirely as a 
matter of choice. And it is equally clear that when Congress creates 
law, it is creating federal law, not state law. That is the case even 
when the federal law is based (either entirely or only in part) on state 
law. 
It should be acknowledged that when Congress adopts state law as 
a component of a federal statute, the federal court that interprets and 
adopts the federal statute has no choice in the matter of whether state 
law applies. If Congress has explicitly incorporated state law into a 
federal statute, then the federal court is bound by this congressional 
choice. And even in cases where Congress has not explicitly 
incorporated state law, the federal court’s decision to adopt state law 
                                                                                                                 
134 Id.  
135 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 157–61 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
136 Id. at 164. 
137 547 U.S. 677 (2006). 
138 Id. at 692. 
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may not be the result of a meaningfully free choice. If there is a 
strong indication of congressional intent to adopt state law, then the 
federal court will do so. The absence of an explicit directive to apply 
state law is not dispositive; the weight of evidence regarding 
congressional intent may leave the federal court with only one real 
option: to adopt state law as a component of federal law. Ultimately, 
however, this lack of choice on the part of the federal court in these 
circumstances is irrelevant: the fact that Congress had a choice is 
what makes incorporated state law an expression of federal law. 
Because state law applies as a matter of choice in the incorporated-
state-law context, the Erie obligation to apply state law accurately 
does not apply.139 As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Erie held 
that the federal court lacked the power to create a rule governing the 
standard of care to which Erie Railroad would be held vis-à-vis 
individuals like Harry Tompkins.140 And the subsequent “Erie cases” 
in which federal courts were required to apply state law are all cases 
that reflect the conclusion that the federal court lacked the power to 
apply anything other than state law.141 It is this same line of cases that 
recognized the federal obligation to apply state law “accurately,” that 
is, to apply state law as the state courts would. Where the precedent 
condition—the lack of power to apply anything other than state law—
does not exist, the consequent obligation—to apply state law 
accurately—does not exist either.142 
The Supreme Court has on occasion given indications that federal 
courts should apply state law accurately even in the incorporated-
state-law context. In McMillian v. Monroe County,143 the Court 
arguably created a bridge between the incorporated-state-law and Erie 
                                                                                                                 
139 Of course, the obligation to apply state law accurately could be imposed by Congress. 
That is, when Congress incorporates state law, it could instruct the federal courts to apply state 
law as the state courts would. Alternatively, Congress might instruct the federal courts to apply 
state law accurately, but only when an accurate application is consistent with the federal statute. 
140 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. The federal common-law cases are the 
same: there is no federal statute that governs the issue at hand, one party seeks to have the 
federal court create a federal common-law rule to govern, but the exercise of federal common 
law making is considered illegitimate and so the federal court is required to apply state law. See 
supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which federal courts were denied 
the authority to craft common-law rules). 
142 Federal common law is an area “untouched by . . . Erie.” United States v. Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 308 (1947) (holding that the U.S. government’s tortious-
interference claim against tortfeasors who injured a soldier was “governed by the rule of 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States . . . rather than that of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins” (citation 
omitted)); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (stating that 
“the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply” to the instant case, which was instead 
governed by federal common law (citation omitted)). 
143 520 U.S. 781 (1997). 
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lines of cases. The federal statute at issue in that case, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, imposed liability on Monroe County for the behavior of its 
sheriff only if the sheriff was a “policymaker” as a matter of state 
law.144 In determining whether the sheriff was a policymaker, the 
Court invoked a principle that was associated at the time with Erie 
cases. In particular, the Court invoked the principle that it would defer 
to the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Alabama law because 
Alabama was located within the Eleventh Circuit.145 Nonetheless, the 
Court has expressly required federal courts to apply state law 
“accurately” in the incorporated-state-law setting, and opinions like 
McMillian do not change that. When federal courts apply 
incorporated state law, they are not currently under a doctrinal 
obligation to apply the state law as state courts would. 
A final point to be made about the doctrinal landscape of 
incorporated state law is that state law is generally borrowed with the 
understanding that it should serve federal interests. This need not be 
the case: Congress could instruct federal courts to apply state law 
even when faithful application appears to undermine the very federal 
statute for which state law was borrowed. But it is unlikely to do so. 
To the contrary, Congress is more likely to do what it has done, which 
is to instruct the federal courts to borrow state law but only insofar as 
it “is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”146 Thus, the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann147 held 
that the fate of a § 1983 action filed in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana was governed by the Louisiana survivorship statute.148 The 
Court recognized that “the ultimate rule adopted under § 1988 ‘is a 
federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is 
impaired.’”149 The Court also recognized that state law might not 
                                                                                                                 
144 See id. at 786 (“[O]ur inquiry [of whether the sheriff was a final policymaker] is 
dependent on an analysis of state law.” (citing Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 
(1997); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion))).  
145 Id. (“Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals includes Alabama, we defer 
considerably to that court’s expertise in interpreting Alabama law.” (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 738; 
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484 n.13)). As the dissent pointed out, this principle was arguably 
inappropriate in light of the Court’s recent holding in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 
225 (1991), that courts of appeals should review district courts’ determinations of state law. 
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 797 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). That disagreement is not relevant to 
my point here, which is simply to acknowledge that there are some indications of Erie-type 
deference in the incorporated-state-law context. 
146 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2006) (instructing federal courts to apply state laws in certain 
civil-rights proceedings). 
147 436 U.S. 584 (1978). 
148 See id. at 589–95 (holding that federal law does not address the survival of a § 1983 
action and adopting the Louisiana survivorship statute). 
149 Id. at 588–89 (quoting Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703 (1973)); see also 
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govern if the plaintiff’s death was itself caused by the deprivation of 
civil rights or if the state rule regarding survival was inconsistent with 
federal civil rights law.150 Perhaps the most likely scenario is that 
Congress will fail to specify the extent to which it wants state law 
incorporated. 
Just as Congress could theoretically choose to incorporate state 
law even if it undermines federal interests, federal courts could 
choose to adopt state law, as a matter of statutory interpretation or 
federal common law, even when state law would be inconsistent with 
the relevant body of federal law for which state law was adopted. But 
this is unrealistic. When a federal court adopts state law as a matter of 
statutory construction or federal common law, it will do so in order to 
advance, rather than undermine, federal interests. Thus, in 
Reconstruction Finance Corp., the Court made clear that state 
property laws would not apply if they “effect a discrimination against 
the Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act.”151 
And in De Sylva v. Ballentine, the Court adopted the state-law 
definition of the word “children” only “to the extent that there are 
permissible variations in the ordinary concept of ‘children.’”152 Thus, 
when state law is adopted as a matter of federal common law, it is 
typically adopted with the understanding that it should serve, rather 
than undermine, federal interests.153 
III. EXPLORING THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
OF EXISTING DOCTRINE 
At first glance, incorporating state law might look like an 
opportunity for federal law to be more sensitive to variations among 
states and to expand the reach of state law. For this reason, 
incorporating state law may appear to be more “respectful” of state 
                                                                                                                 
 
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (reiterating that § 1988 “emphasizes ‘the 
predominance of the federal interest’ in the borrowing process” (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 
U.S. 42, 48 (1984))); Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (explaining that § 1988 requires a three-step 
process and the third step “asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply 
state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a))); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969) 
(“The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive 
to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.”). 
150 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594–95. 
151 Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). 
152 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956). 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979) 
(acknowledging that “specific objectives of the federal programs” and/or a need for uniformity 
may weigh against incorporation of state law). 
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law. It is, however, worth scrutinizing incorporated state law closely 
because there exists the possibility that it will lead to federal courts 
more often mispredicting open areas or even inaccurately articulating 
state-law principles. This is because a federal court that is interpreting 
and applying state law in the incorporated context will consider 
federal interests in a way that it could not in the Erie context. 
A. Conceptual Problems 
Whenever a federal court applies state law, there is a risk that the 
federal court may apply the law in a way that is different than the 
state courts would have.154 I use the term “error” as shorthand for this 
difference, but in doing so I do not intend to bury the discussion of 
whether such deviation is problematic or perfectly acceptable.  
The federal court may make at least two types of error when it 
applies state law: outcome and process error. Outcome error occurs 
when the federal court arrives at a conclusion that is different from 
the conclusion that a state court faced with the same case would have 
reached. Process error occurs when the federal court employs 
reasoning that the state courts would not have employed. For 
example, federal courts may look to authorities that state courts would 
not consider persuasive and/or take policies into account that the state 
courts would not have.155 Process error and outcome error may often 
                                                                                                                 
154 The reference to state courts in general, rather than the highest state court in particular, 
is deliberate. Doctrinally, a federal court in the Erie context is required to apply state law as the 
highest state court would. See, e.g., Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 
306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) (“It was the duty of the federal court to apply the law of [the state] as 
declared by its highest court.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))). The 
federal court is permitted to depart from interpretations of law issued by state trial courts and 
intermediate state appellate courts. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 
(1967) (“[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court 
as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling.”). At the same time, 
the opinions of intermediate state appellate courts are important “dat[a] for ascertaining state 
law.” West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (cautioning federal courts to 
disregard a state appellate court’s pronouncement of law only if the federal court “is convinced 
by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise” (citing Six 
Cos. of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 
311 U.S. 169 (1940))). Moreover, the outcomes in federal courts acting under the Erie 
obligation should not substantially differ from outcomes in state courts. See, e.g., Guar. Trust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[I]n all cases where a federal court is exercising 
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the 
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the 
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”). Thus, a federal court may 
certainly not casually disregard the opinions of lower state courts, and the federal court arguably 
should defer to those courts in at least some situations. For example, if all intermediate state 
appellate courts are in agreement about a particular principle of law, it would be troubling for a 
federal court to blaze its own trail. 
155 There are scholars who would object to the “error” label here on the grounds that 
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go together, but one may occur without the other. Process error 
standing alone is not necessarily problematic,156 but it is nonetheless 
worth identifying because a particular type of process error is likely to 
occur in the area of incorporated state law, and this particular process 
error might increase the risk of outcome error. 
Errors occur even when the federal courts are acting under the 
obligation of Erie to apply state law faithfully. These errors typically 
occur when federal courts are uncertain about the content of state law. 
If the content of state law were entirely clear, then the federal court 
would be obliged to follow it. If the highest state court, however, has 
not addressed the issue confronting the federal court, then the 
Supreme Court has instructed the federal court to decide the case in a 
way that is most consistent with the way in which the highest state 
court would decide it.157 But the federal court’s prediction may turn 
out to be incorrect—i.e., the highest state court may resolve the 
question differently than the federal court predicted it would.158 
Similarly, if the issue confronting the federal court is highly fact-
sensitive, such that authority from the highest state court does not 
clearly point to one conclusion, then too the federal court must use its 
judgment in analyzing the facts, and it may reach a result that is 
different than the one state courts would have reached. As another 
example, if the authority from the highest state court has been 
weakened by the passage of events over time, the federal court may 
                                                                                                                 
 
federal courts should engage in reasoning that is different from that of state courts because the 
federal courts’ reasoning may be superior or generate a productive dialogue between the state 
and federal judiciaries. Some level of cross-pollination may be beneficial, but I believe there is 
reason to be suspicious of whether there truly exists a dialogue between state and federal 
judiciaries, rather than a one-sided conversation in which the federal courts enjoy the advantage. 
In any event, even if a productive dialogue exists, my view is that the particular process error 
discussed later—the insertion of federal interests—is not desirable. 
156 Process error in one case, even if unaccompanied by outcome error, could lead to 
outcome error in subsequent cases. For example, if a federal court reaches the “right” 
conclusion about state law but does so for the “wrong” reasons, a subsequent court might rely 
on the first federal court’s erroneous reasoning—for example, the primacy of a particular 
interest that the state courts would not take into account—and such reasoning might lead the 
subsequent court to commit an outcome error. 
157 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 172 (1942) (“When state law has not been 
authoritatively declared . . . it is [a federal court’s duty] to ascertain from all available data what 
the highest court of the state will probably hold the state law to be.” (citing Wichita Royalty Co., 
306 U.S. 103; West, 311 U.S. 223)). 
158 At least one scholar argues that it is bizarre to call this an error because the federal court 
is not getting anything wrong at the time it predicts state law. That is, if state law is only what 
the state sovereign declares, then there can be no error if the highest court has not yet spoken. 
Glassman, supra note 70, at 281. At a minimum, however, the federal court is “wrong” in its 
prediction, and the term “error” allows for discussion of the instances in which a federal court 
reaches a result (or utilizes a process) that state courts would not. 
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be forced to use its judgment to determine the now-applicable law, 
and it may arrive at a conclusion that is different than the one the state 
courts would have reached. 
The incorporated-state-law context, however, is even more prone 
to error than the Erie context. This is because the federal court in the 
incorporated-state-law context applies state law for a different reason. 
In short, the federal court (in the incorporated-state-law context) 
applies state law to serve federal purposes. When federal courts 
borrow state law to fill in the content of a federal common-law rule, 
they do so only insofar as state law serves federal interests; they 
retain the option of discarding state law if it does not do so. The 
Supreme Court has declared more than once that it is appropriate to 
reject state law if it is inconsistent with federal law.159 Where 
Congress has explicitly incorporated state law, the federal courts’ 
ability to discard state law may be constrained by congressional 
intent, but Congress is unlikely to have directed the federal courts to 
apply state law even when doing so would undermine the federal 
statute for which it has been borrowed (or any other federal law). 
Thus, regardless of whether Congress or the courts made the choice to 
borrow state law, it is always borrowed in service of federal law. 
Because state law is borrowed to advance federal objectives, the 
federal court seeks to accomplish at least two goals when it applies 
incorporated state law: to apply the law that will best—or at least 
adequately—serve federal interests and to apply the borrowed law 
accurately.160 These goals may be in harmony with each other: federal 
interests may be best served by applying the law exactly as the state 
courts would.161 Alternatively, these two goals may be in tension: an 
accurate application of state law may be contrary to federal interests.  
                                                                                                                 
159 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (“[S]tate law shall only apply ‘so 
far as the same is not inconsistent with’ federal law.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a))); Burnett v. 
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984) (“[C]ourts are to apply state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a))); 
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available 
state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that 
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to 
turn away from state law.”). 
160 This second goal is considerably less important than the first. See, e.g., Wilson, 471 
U.S. at 269 (“The importation of the policies and purposes of the States on matters of civil rights 
is not the primary office of the borrowing provision in § 1988 . . . . Congress surely did not 
intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of 
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.”).  
161 See, e.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960) (“We think it more 
harmonious with the tenets of our federal system and more consistent with what Congress has 
already done in this area, not to . . . displac[e] . . . state [law] . . . or superimpose[e] on [it] a new 
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Where a state’s law is clear, and its conflict with federal law is 
also clear, federal courts may well recognize and publicly identify the 
conflict. In the face of such a conflict, the federal court may create a 
uniform federal rule rather than adopting state law as the rule of 
decision. It may also discard one particular state’s law, while keeping 
open the possibility that the federal common-law rule will continue to 
borrow the law from every other state. In United States v. Little Lake 
Misere Land Co.,162 the Supreme Court retained the option of 
borrowing state property law to “generally govern federal land 
acquisitions,” but refused to borrow Louisiana’s law in the case 
before it.163 
The following hypothetical three-step analysis would be even 
more transparent: First, the federal court would analyze state law in 
the absence of the federal context in which state law resides (or might 
reside) in the particular case before it. In other words, the federal 
court would attempt to strip away any federal interests that might 
influence its analysis of state law. This should be exactly the type of 
analysis that a federal court conducts in the Erie context. Second, the 
federal court would consider whether the state law would comfortably 
fit within the federal statutory or common-law scheme into which it 
has been (or might be) incorporated. If it did, the federal court would 
apply state law. But if it did not, the federal court would explain that 
the state law does not adequately serve federal interests. The federal 
court would then proceed to the third step, in which it would 
announce that it will do one of the following: (1) abandon the 
borrowing approach altogether in favor of a uniform federal rule to 
govern the issue, (2) abandon the borrowing approach in favor of a 
federal rule for this state only, or (3) adopt a modified version of state 
law as the federal rule for this state.164 In so doing, the federal court 
would clearly identify the rule it ultimately adopted as a federal one. 
If there were any confusion, one need only refer to the first step, in 
which the federal court analyzed state law in the absence of federal 
interests. If the rule ultimately adopted by the federal court were 
                                                                                                                 
 
federal rule.” (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939))). 
162 412 U.S. 580 (1973). 
163 Id. at 595 (“[E]ven if it be assumed that the established body of state property law 
should generally govern federal land acquisitions, we are persuaded that the particular rule of 
law before us today—Louisiana’s Act 315 of 1940, as retroactively applied—may not.”). 
164 The only difference between the second and third option is the similarity between the 
federal rule and state law: option two contemplates a federal rule that does not resemble state 
law at all, whereas option three contemplates a federal rule that looks somewhat like state law.  
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different from the rule announced in step one, it would be clear that 
the rule ultimately adopted was not state law. 
Federal courts do not, of course, engage in this three-step analysis 
when they apply incorporated state law. No one has suggested that 
they should analyze state law in the absence of federal interests before 
applying it in its incorporated context, nor is such a development 
likely. Rather, federal courts confront and ascertain state law within 
the federal context into which state law has been imported. As a 
result, federal interests are likely to occupy a primary position in the 
court’s process. Federal courts may (rightly, at least as a formal 
matter) perceive their task as formulating federal law, and they are 
unlikely to be focused on the reality that they are also interpreting and 
announcing state law. Nor are the litigants likely to be concerned 
about the broad significance of any state-law principles articulated. If 
an accurate application of state law will serve their interests, they will 
certainly argue in favor of such interpretation. But it is as likely that 
they will argue in favor of an “erroneous” application. As a result, 
and especially if a state’s law is unclear, a federal court may allow—
consciously or unconsciously—the federal interests at stake to 
influence its understanding of state law. The federal court will 
therefore interpret the state law in a way that is consistent with federal 
interests. This may lead to different results than would have obtained 
if a state court were interpreting the law. In other words, the federal 
court may announce a different rule than a state court would have 
announced, or it may apply a rule to facts in a different manner than 
state courts would. And it will do so because its interpretation of state 
law better fits the federal law than any other interpretation. This 
process error leads to outcome error: the federal court’s interpretation 
is not what the state courts would adopt.165 
Before considering the potential impact of outcome errors in the 
incorporated-state-law context, it is worth noting that it may be 
impossible to avoid error in the incorporated-state-law context. The 
potential existence of two competing goals—furtherance of federal 
interests and accurate application of state law—may lead to process 
error every time the federal court applies incorporated state law. It 
will be nearly impossible—and probably not even desirable—for the 
federal court to apply state law without taking federal interests, 
values, and policies into account when determining the content of 
                                                                                                                 
165 Nor would the federal interpretation be the one that a federal court discharging its Erie 
obligation would reach, because that federal court would not have any federal interests weighing 
in favor of a particular result. 
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borrowed state law. Such federal considerations would not inform the 
state courts’ interpretations and applications of state law, because 
state legislatures and courts are highly unlikely to be formulating state 
law in the hopes—or even the recognition—that it will be 
incorporated into federal law.  
On the other hand, perhaps state lawmakers consider federal 
interests once a particular body of state law has been incorporated 
into federal law. If the state lawmakers are happy to have state law 
incorporated into federal law—that is, if incorporation of state law 
benefits the state and promotes state interests—then further 
developments of state law will seek to keep state law consistent with 
federal interests, so that state law will remain part of federal law. If 
this is the case, then perhaps the accommodation of federal interests is 
not a process error. But even if a state were to take federal interests 
into account, it is unlikely to elevate such interests above state 
concerns. A federal court interpreting incorporated state law, on the 
other hand, will be required to focus primarily on the federal law, and 
it is likely to elevate the federal context in which a particular state 
rule of law appears above the various other state contexts in which 
that rule functions. Thus, at least minor process errors are bound to 
occur, and in the more likely scenario—where state law has not been 
formulated by state lawmakers to take federal interests into account—
a more significant process error may occur because the federal court 
will take federal interests into account which a state court would not. 
These federal interests may lead the federal court to commit an 
outcome error. 
Outcome errors have the potential to spread beyond the particular 
incorporated-state-law context in which they first occurred. If the 
state law has been borrowed for more than one federal purpose, then a 
federal opinion interpreting the state-law concept in one incorporated 
context is likely to be followed by federal courts interpreting that 
same state-law concept in other incorporated contexts. For example, 
assume that several different federal statutes borrow the state-law 
concept of property, and a federal court is confronted with the 
question of whether state law recognizes X as property. (Assume 
further that it is appropriate to furnish only one answer to that 
question. In other words, state law will not say that X both is and is 
not property, depending on the situation.166) If there is no clear 
                                                                                                                 
166 As stated, this assumption may be too unrealistic to swallow, especially because it is all 
too common for something to constitute property for some purposes and not for others. Cf. 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has endorsed three different conceptions of property for 
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guidance from the highest state court as to whether X is property as a 
matter of state law, the federal court could very well be faced with 
one choice that is more consistent with state precedents, but another 
choice that better serves federal objectives.  
Ultimately, the federal court commits an error: it decides that X is 
property as a matter of state law, but the highest state court, faced 
with the same case, would have decided the opposite. Moreover, the 
federal court reached its erroneous conclusion because it was more 
consistent with the federal statute. The federal court’s outcome error 
is unlikely to be limited to this one federal statute; the opinion is 
likely to be followed by subsequent federal courts—interpreting 
different federal statutes—that are facing the question of whether X is 
property as a matter of state law. These subsequent federal courts are 
unlikely to consult state-court opinions to determine for themselves 
whether X is property as a matter of state law, because there is a 
federal opinion that is almost directly on point. The only reason why 
the opinion is not completely on point is that the state-law concept of 
property was embedded within a different federal statute than is at 
issue in the subsequent federal cases. Indeed, if the court of appeals in 
a given circuit had written the federal opinion, it would be difficult to 
imagine that a federal district court within that circuit or future three-
judge panels of that circuit would not feel bound to follow the first 
court’s (erroneous) conclusion that X is property as a matter of state 
law. Courts from other circuits may be free to disagree with the first 
federal court, but they may not if they have developed principles of 
deference. For example, a court from a circuit may defer to another 
court within the circuit that encompasses the relevant state.167 They 
may defer even if state courts have cast doubt on the rule announced 
by the first federal court.168 
As discussed above, the first federal court can avoid error if it 
explicitly departs from state law in favor of a uniform federal rule or a 
                                                                                                                 
 
constitutional purposes depending on whether the context is procedural due process, substantive 
due process, or takings). But the assumption is just another way of describing the following real 
occurrence: if a federal statute borrows a state-law concept such as property, and property has 
different meanings in different state-law contexts, then the federal court will have to decide 
which state-law context has been (or should be) incorporated into the federal statute. 
167 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282–83 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(deferring to the Sixth Circuit’s determination that Tennessee law did not allow a right of 
publicity to survive the celebrity’s death, even though it had concerns about that rule). 
168 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1983) (continuing 
to defer to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Tennessee law in the face of contrary expressions 
of law by state trial courts). 
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federal rule crafted for one particular state. But it may not feel the 
need to do so if there is room to interpret the state law in a way that is 
consistent with federal law. The federal court could also avoid error if 
it engaged in the hypothetical three-step analysis outlined above and 
clearly labeled as federal the rule it ultimately adopted a federal rule. 
Federal courts are unlikely to take on the obligation to engage in such 
a comprehensive analysis. There is yet a third way in which a federal 
court could make it process transparent, thereby diminishing the 
possibility of error replication. The court could disclose the influence 
of federal interests on its analysis of state law. This would make the 
case distinguishable as a matter of precedent, and it might 
communicate the need for subsequent federal courts to independently 
investigate state law to determine whether the first court’s state-law 
conclusions are correct. Again, however, such transparency is 
unlikely: the federal court would have to be completely conscious of 
the role that federal interests are playing in its determination of state 
law, and it would also have to be comfortable with that role, such that 
it would be willing to share its process with the world. 
In the absence of a clear signal from the federal court that federal 
interests have influenced its interpretation of state law, subsequent 
courts will not necessarily reveal the prior court’s process. Especially 
if state law is unclear, those subsequent federal courts may still 
continue to follow (or defer to) the first court’s opinion. To do 
otherwise might be perceived as accusing the first court of engaging 
in unseemly results-oriented behavior. Imagine what the subsequent 
federal court would say: “State law is unclear. The first federal court 
decided that X is property, but we read the state law to conclude that 
X is not property.” Why? “Because the first federal court reached its 
conclusion on the basis of federal interests that are not present in this 
case.” In other words, the first federal court did not reach the result 
that is most consistent with state precedent, but rather reached a 
conclusion that works best for the federal system. It is difficult to 
imagine that a district court would be willing to say this about an 
appellate opinion or that an appellate panel would say this about a 
prior panel from its own circuit. Again, a court from a different circuit 
may be able to provide an alternative by simply saying, “We disagree 
with the first court about whether X is property as a matter of state 
law.” This will be more difficult to do if the court ordinarily defers to 
the opinions of courts that are geographically connected to the state. 
The federal court’s error may also spread to federal courts that are 
interpreting and applying state law in the Erie context. Again, the first 
federal opinion is almost directly on point: what makes it 
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distinguishable is that the federal court could have discarded the state-
law concept of property in favor of a federal rule (uniform across 
states or crafted just for state). But of course, the federal court did not 
do that. Instead, the federal court reached a conclusion that X is 
property as a matter of state law. 
These errors by federal courts are likely to affect how prospective 
litigants—individuals and entities—understand state law. For the 
reasons discussed above, other courts might consider a federal court’s 
erroneous opinion controlling or at least highly persuasive. Similarly, 
prospective litigants may look to federal opinions to understand how 
state law operates: the case with the most similar facts will be 
significant to a lawyer, even if it comes from a federal court, rather 
than a state court.169 Indeed, federal judges occupy a position of 
prestige in the hierarchical legal profession, so a federal opinion 
addressing an issue of state law may not be viewed as inferior to a 
state judicial opinion at all. At a minimum, the federal 
misinterpretation of state law will lead to confusion and uncertainty, 
as well as forum shopping. 
B. Practical Examination: Evans v. Chavis 
This Article does not attempt to empirically test the hypothesis that 
doctrinal freedom in the category of incorporated state law causes 
federal courts to misapply state law. If does, however, explore the 
conceptual problems articulated above by examining a comparatively 
recent (and largely unknown) case. In this case, the Supreme Court of 
the United States appears to have misapplied California law because a 
faithful application would have undermined its vision of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996170 (AEDPA), 
the federal statute in which California law was embedded. To 
understand the Court’s decision in Evans v. Chavis,171 it is necessary 
to provide some background about AEDPA and the Court’s prior 
interpretation of it. 
AEDPA governs petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal 
court by individuals wishing to challenge their state criminal 
convictions.172 Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, and it created for 
                                                                                                                 
169 Whatever the formal force of an announced legal rule, “by way of written and openly 
available decision[],” it can exert persuasive force and affect the path of the law. Brendan S. 
Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1537 (2010). 
170 Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
171 546 U.S. 189 (2006). 
172 AEDPA governs petitions filed by federal prisoners as well. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & 
 
 1/14/2011 1:11:07 AM 
2011] INCORPORATED STATE LAW 35 
the first time a statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas 
petition.173 AEDPA requires most federal petitions to be filed within 
one year of the date on which the state court judgment of conviction 
becomes final.174 A state court judgment becomes final upon “the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 
such review.”175 AEDPA also requires total exhaustion of state 
remedies.176 In order to obtain federal review of his or her 
constitutional claims, the petitioner must first present those claims to 
the state courts.177 Petitioners often find themselves having to employ 
state collateral proceedings because they neglected to raise all of their 
claims in the process of direct review or because they want to assert 
claims that cannot be raised in the process of direct review.178 These 
state collateral proceedings can consume more than one year. 
To allow petitioners to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, AEDPA 
tolls “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.”179 In other 
                                                                                                                 
 
JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.2 (5th ed. 2005) 
(providing an overview of AEDPA).  
173 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006) (“Until AEDPA took effect in 1996, 
no statute of limitations applied to habeas petitions. Courts invoked the doctrine of ‘prejudicial 
delay’ to screen out unreasonably late filings.” (citation omitted)).  
174 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006). Actually, the one-year statute of limitations can 
begin to run from a number of different dates, see id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D), but the date in 
subsection (A) is the “date likely to apply to most [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 motions [related to habeas 
corpus] (or to most claims in such motions),” 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 172, § 5.2b, at 
247–48. For petitioners whose convictions became final before AEDPA took effect, the one-
year statute of limitations began to run on April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See 
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002) (explaining that the respondent had one year from 
AEDPA’s effective date to file a habeas petition). 
175 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 
176 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (explaining that 
before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus the prisoner must exhaust state remedies). 
177 See, e.g., Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (“[T]he prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in 
each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary 
review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” (citing O’Sullivan v. 
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995))); 
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to 
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established 
appellate review process.”). 
178 “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if she properly pursues a 
claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 
judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 172, 
§ 23.3b, at 1065. “As long as the petitioner pursued a claim throughout a ‘full round’ of state 
postconviction proceedings — i.e., as long as she takes advantage of the available trial-court 
postconviction procedures and appeals any adverse trial-court rulings to as many courts as state 
law requires to adjudicate an appeal — the claim will be considered exhausted even though it 
was not raised at trial and/or on direct appeal.” Id. § 23.3b, at 1073. 
179 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
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words, the statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition is 
tolled while a state habeas petition is “pending.” Congress included 
this tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA to allow federal 
habeas petitioners to exhaust state remedies by using the 
postconviction proceedings to present their claims to state courts 
without worrying that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations would 
expire.180 
Carey v. Saffold181 required the Court to interpret the meaning of 
the word “pending” in § 2244(d)(2). In particular, the Court had to 
decide whether “that word cover[s] the time between a lower state 
court’s decision [on a state habeas petition] and the filing of a notice 
of appeal to a higher state court.”182 The Court held that it did.183 The 
Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the word “pending” to 
conclude that “an application is pending as long as the ordinary state 
collateral review process is ‘in continuance’—i.e., ‘until the 
completion of’ that process.”184 As a result the Court stated, “[U]ntil 
the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s 
postconviction procedures, by definition it remains ‘pending.’”185 
Agreeing with every circuit to have addressed the issue, the Court 
concluded that a state habeas petition is “‘pending’ during the interval 
between a lower court’s determination and filing of [a request for 
review] in a higher court.”186 Importantly, however, the Court in 
                                                                                                                 
180 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179–80 (2001) (explaining that the tolling 
provision was included within AEDPA to “promote[] the exhaustion of state remedies”).  
181 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 
182 Id. at 217. 
183 Id. at 218–21. 
184 Id. at 219–20 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1669 
(1993)). 
185 Id. at 220. 
186 Id. at 220–21. I use the term “request for review” rather than “notice of appeal” because 
the Court in Saffold had to consider whether its newly announced rule—that a state habeas 
petition is “pending” in the interval between a lower court’s decision and a filing in the higher 
court—applied in California, where state habeas petitioners are not required to file a notice of 
appeal from denial of their petition for writ of habeas corpus, but rather are allowed to file an 
original petition for writ of habeas corpus at every level. See id. at 221. 
That is, in most states, state habeas petitioners file a petition in the state trial court, then 
file a notice of appeal in the intermediate appellate court, and then file a request for review in 
the highest state appellate court. See id. at 219 (describing the collateral review process in most 
states and citing the rules of Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, and Kentucky). 
In California, by contrast, the ordinary practice is to file an original petition for habeas 
corpus at every level. Id. at 221; see also id. at 224 (“California . . . has engrained original 
writs—both at the appellate level and in the supreme court—into its normal collateral review 
process.”). The superior courts, the courts of appeal, and the California Supreme Court all have 
original jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas relief. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
Indeed, if a superior court denies a habeas petition, the prisoner’s only recourse is to file a 
new original petition in a higher state court, rather than a notice of appeal. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 
729, 740 n.7 (Cal. 1993). If the superior court denies the petition, the prisoner may file a new 
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Saffold added that a state habeas petition would not be considered 
“pending” during that interval if the filing in the higher court were 
untimely as a matter of state law.187 
The specific facts before the Court concerned Tony Saffold, who 
filed a federal habeas petition challenging his California state 
conviction and who was seeking tolling of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations for the period of time in which he had sought California 
state habeas relief.188 Specifically, Saffold sought tolling for an 
interval of four-and-one-half months between a decision by the 
California Court of Appeal and his filing in the California Supreme 
Court.189 The California Supreme Court had denied Saffold’s habeas 
petition,190 but it was not clear whether the petition was untimely 
filed, because California does not impose a fixed deadline on a habeas 
petitioner seeking review from an appellate court.191 Instead, “a 
                                                                                                                 
 
original petition in the California Court of Appeal. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 216 n.2 (Cal. 
1983), overruled on other grounds by In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311 (Cal. 2004). Alternatively, the 
prisoner may file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1506 (West 2000) (explaining that after habeas corpus heard in court of appeal the defendant 
may apply for a hearing in the California Supreme Court). When filing original petitions, 
petitioners are not required to first file in the superior court, then in the court of appeal, and then 
in the Supreme Court. Even though this is the preferred order, see In re Ramirez, 89 Cal. App. 
4th 1312, 1316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that because a habeas application was not made in 
the lower courts, the appellate court has the discretion to refuse to issue the writ), the option 
does remain for the petitioner to go out of order. 
California also differs from other states in that there is no fixed deadline to file an original 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Instead, “a petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need 
only file a petition without substantial delay, or if delayed, adequately explain the delay.” In re 
Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 397 (Cal. 1993) (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain, 209 
P.2d 793, 796 (1949)). If a petitioner chooses to file a petition for review in the California 
Supreme Court, rather than a new original petition for review, then a fixed deadline does exist: a 
petition for review must be filed within ten days of the date on which the order issued by the 
court of appeal became final. CAL. R. CT. 8.500(e). 
187 See 536 U.S. at 225–27 (discussing the issue of whether Saffold’s state habeas petition 
was untimely as a matter of California law and stating that “[i]f the California Supreme Court 
had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4½-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the end of 
the matter” and Saffold would not be entitled to tolling for the interval between the decision by 
the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court); see also Evans v. Chavis, 
546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (“[A]n application for state postconviction review is ‘pending’ [in] the 
period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a 
notice of appeal, provided that that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” 
(citing Saffold, 536 U.S. 214)). 
188 536 U.S. at 217–18. 
189 Id. at 217 (explaining that Saffold first filed a state habeas petition in the California 
Superior Court, which denied it, then filed an unsuccessful petition in the California Court of 
Appeal, and then—four-and-one-half months after the denial by the California Court of 
Appeal—filed a petition in the California Supreme Court).  
190 Id. at 217–18 (“[The California Supreme Court] denied Saffold’s petition, stating in a 
single sentence that it did so ‘on the merits and for lack of diligence.’”). 
191 More specifically, when a California habeas petitioner files a petition for writ of habeas 
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petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need only file a petition 
without substantial delay, or if delayed, adequately explain the 
delay.”192 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit 
to consider whether Saffold’s filing in the California Supreme Court 
had been timely.193 The Court did suggest that it might “be 
appropriate to certify a question to the California Supreme Court for 
the purpose of seeking clarification in this area of state law.”194 
In Evans v. Chavis, the Court was again confronted with an 
individual incarcerated in California state prison, seeking federal 
habeas relief, and attempting to obtain tolling of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations for the time during which he was pursuing state habeas 
relief. Chavis filed more than one round of habeas petitions in the 
California state courts, and by the time he filed his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in federal district court, more than four years had 
passed since AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations had begun to 
run.195 
Chavis sought tolling for various periods, including the interval of 
three years between a decision by the California Court of Appeal and 
his next filing, in the California Supreme Court.196 As in Saffold, the 
California Supreme Court had denied the petition for writ of habeas 
                                                                                                                 
 
corpus in a state trial court, and the state trial court denies the petition, the petitioner seeks 
review of that denial by filing an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in a higher appellate 
court, preferably the California Court of Appeal. In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 740 n.7. If the court of 
appeal denies the petition, the petitioner may file either a new original petition in the California 
Supreme Court, see In re Reed, 663 P.2d at 216 n.2, or a petition for review in the California 
Supreme Court, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1506. There is no fixed deadline to file an original 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in California. See In re Harris, 855 P.2d at 397 (“[A] 
petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need only file a petition without substantial delay, or 
if delayed, adequately explain the delay.” (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain, 
209 P.2d at 796)). 
192 In re Harris, 855 P.2d at 397 (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 751; Ex parte Swain, 209 
P.2d at 796). As explained supra note 186, this is true when the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus is an original petition, rather than a petition for review. If the petitioner chooses to file a 
petition for review in the California Supreme Court, rather than a new original petition for 
review, then a fixed deadline does exist: a petition for review must be filed within ten days of 
the date on which the order issued by the court of appeal became final. CAL. R. CT. 8.500(e). 
193 Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225–26 (“It remains to ask whether Saffold delayed ‘unreasonably’ 
in seeking California Supreme Court review. . . . We leave it to the Court of Appeals to evaluate 
these and any other relevant considerations in the first instance.”). 
194 Id. at 226–27. 
195 Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 195 (2006). Chavis’s conviction became final before 
AEDPA was enacted, so the statute of limitations began to run on April 24, 1996, the effective 
date of AEDPA. Chavis v. Garcia, No. CVS00 2496, 2001 WL 35939717, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
20, 2001), rev’d sub nom. Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189; see also Chavis, 546 U.S. at 195 (explaining that AEDPA gives 
prisoners one year to file federal petitions). 
196 Chavis, 546 U.S. at 195–96. 
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corpus, but it had not ruled explicitly on the timeliness question.197 
The district court denied Chavis’s federal habeas petition as 
untimely.198 The Ninth Circuit reversed, giving Chavis the benefit of 
tolling for the three-year period.199 The Ninth Circuit did not decide 
for itself whether the California Supreme Court filing was timely as a 
matter of state law.200 Instead, the Ninth Circuit employed a 
presumption to reach the conclusion that Chavis’s filing was not 
untimely under California state law.201 Because the Ninth Circuit 
tolled the three-year interval between the decision by the California 
Court of Appeal and Chavis’s filing in the California Supreme Court, 
the court was able to conclude that Chavis’s federal habeas petition 
was timely.202 
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in using its 
presumption: the California Supreme Court had not indicated whether 
the filing was timely or not, so the Ninth Circuit should have 
determined for itself whether Chavis’s filing in the California 
Supreme Court was timely as a matter of state law.203 The Court itself 
then analyzed the timeliness of Chavis’s filing, and concluded that it 
was untimely.204 It is this last aspect of the opinion that is of most 
interest because the Court’s brief analysis of California law appears to 
have been informed more by federal interests associated with AEDPA 
than with a desire to ascertain the contents of California law.  
In concluding that a three-and-one-half-year delay was 
unreasonable as a matter of California law, the Supreme Court failed 
                                                                                                                 
197 See id. at 195 (“[T]he California Supreme Court denied the petition in an order stating 
simply, ‘Petition for writ of habeas corpus [i.e., review in the California Supreme Court] is 
DENIED.’” (second alteration in original)). 
198 Garcia, 2001 WL 35939717, at *2 (granting motion to dismiss because the federal 
habeas petition was filed over three years late). 
199 LeMarque, 382 F.3d at 924 (“[W]e hold that Chavis is entitled to tolling for the three-
year interval between his first round petitions to the California Court of Appeal and California 
Supreme Court—an interval during which AEDPA took effect—because the California 
Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely but rather decided it on the merits.”). 
200 See id. at 925–26 (rejecting the state’s argument that the appellate court should 
determine whether Chavis’s filing was timely as a matter of state law and asking instead 
“whether the state court denied the petition as untimely” (citing Saffold v. Carey, 312 F.3d 
1031, 1034–36 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
201 See id. at 926 (explaining that the California Supreme Court’s denial of Chavis’s 
petition would be treated as a decision on the merits, which meant that Chavis’s petition was not 
dismissed as untimely). 
202 See id. at 926–27. 
203 Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006) (“[W]ithout using a merits determination as 
an ‘absolute bellwether’ (as to timeliness), the federal court must decide whether the filing of 
the request for state-court appellate review (in state collateral review proceedings) was made 
within what California would consider a ‘reasonable time.’”). 
204 Id. at 200–01. 
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to discuss or even cite any California cases regarding the timeliness of 
state habeas petitions. The Court did refer to its investigation of 
California law, and it did say that none of the California cases it had 
reviewed supported a conclusion that Chavis’s delay was 
acceptable.205 But it is difficult to believe that the Court’s legal 
research really drove its conclusion. Conspicuously absent from its 
opinion is any mention of the California state-court cases cited in Mr. 
Chavis’s brief that permitted lengthy periods of delay by pro se 
litigants. Rather than confront any of these cases, most of the Court’s 
effort was devoted to an explanation of its assumption that California 
did not intend to provide significantly more time than other states for 
the filing of habeas petitions.206 This assumption was not based on 
any analysis of state law; indeed, it could not have been, since no 
judicial opinions from the California state courts provided any 
indication that California’s indeterminate standard was intended to 
function like the fixed deadlines of other states. Rather, the Supreme 
Court justified its assumption with a line of reasoning that is 
commonly used to divine legislative intent. The Chavis Court pointed 
out that it had articulated its assumption—that California does not 
provide significantly more time to file habeas petitions than do other 
states—in Saffold, and California had not taken any action to correct 
that assumption.207 The reason why the Court used this analysis is 
clear: the Court was concerned that, if California did in fact allow 
long delays in the state habeas process, then application of the tolling 
provision might bring stale federal petitions to the federal courts.208 In 
                                                                                                                 
205 See id. at 201 (“We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing 
reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing 
delay ‘reasonable.’”). 
206 See id. 200–01(“Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of time,’ 30 to 60 
days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002))). The opinion in Evans can be 
contrasted with the opinion in Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011), where the Court was 
required to address the California law of timeliness yet again. In Walker, the Court spent 
considerably more time examining the California cases in order to justify the conclusion that the 
state law was not “inadequate” and could constitute an independent and adequate state law 
ground for denial of the habeas petitioner’s claim. Id. at 1125–26, 1128. 
207 See id. at 199–200 (“In doing so, the Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held 
that timely filings in California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the 
assumption that California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other 
States, i.e., that California’s ‘reasonable time’ standard would not lead to filing delays 
substantially longer than those in States with determinate timeliness rules. California, of course, 
remains free to tell us if, in this respect, we were wrong.” (citation omitted)). 
208 Cf. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226 (“And the Ninth Circuit’s apparent willingness to take such 
words as an absolute bellwether risks the tolling of the federal limitations period even when it is 
highly likely that the prisoner failed to seek timely review in the state appellate courts. The 
Ninth Circuit’s rule consequently threatens to undermine the statutory purpose of encouraging 
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other words, the Supreme Court’s articulation of California law was 
based on a federal interest in having timing requirements read strictly. 
Since Chavis, lower federal courts have similarly failed to look to 
California opinions in determining whether state petitions were timely 
filed. Instead, the lower federal courts have cited the Supreme Court’s 
holding that an unexplained six-month delay is too long to be 
considered reasonable under California law.209 The lower federal 
courts have also focused on the fact that the delays at issue are 
considerably longer than the thirty to sixty days that other states 
provide to file a notice of appeal in state habeas proceedings.210 These 
are not the considerations that the California courts consider when 
determining whether a state habeas petitioner has timely filed his or 
her petition. But such is the risk when federal courts are given 
unfettered discretion to “interpret” incorporated state law in service of 
federal law.211 
CONCLUSION 
The Chavis case represents one example of how federal interests 
may have led a federal court (the Supreme Court of the United States) 
to apply incorporated state law in a way other than state courts would. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the California law of 
timeliness—that it is intended to be similar to the fixed deadlines of 
other states—is difficult to justify in light of the California precedents 
in force in 2006. The Supreme Court appears to have been influenced 
by its perception that a different reading of California law—one that 
                                                                                                                 
 
prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear 
stale claims.” (internal citation omitted)). 
209 See, e.g., Del Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 146 days of 
delay to be unreasonable because it was “not consistent with the short periods of time permitted 
by most states and envisioned by the Supreme Court in reaching its decisions in Saffold and 
Chavis”). 
210 See, e.g., Mayberry v. Hartley, No. 1:09-CV-00873 LJO GSA HC, 2010 WL 2902507, 
at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (“A delay of 196 days, when only 30 or at most 60 days is 
normally allotted, is excessive.”); Johnson v. Lea, No. 1:09-cv-01875-OWW-SMS (HC), 2010 
WL 2773099, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2010) (holding delay of eighty-two days unreasonable 
because “[t]he delay is greater than the short period of time of 30 to 60 days provided by most 
States for filing an appeal”). 
211 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–53, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (No. 
04-721), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-
721.pdf (“Mr. Stris: . . . . Now, because the Federal statute necessarily imports a State standard, 
that’s the very problem with the statute. I can conceive of many instances where -- Chief Justice 
Roberts: Why do you think the Federal statute necessarily imports a State standard? It says that 
the State postconviction proceeding must be pending. And California presents an unusual 
situation, but we interpret that pending is a question of Federal law. It’s not a State standard.”). 
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acknowledged that long delays may in fact be permissible—would 
undermine AEDPA’s limits on federal habeas petitions. Moreover, 
the only clearly established state rule was an indeterminate standard, 
so there was no objectively correct answer to the precise question 
confronting the Court: whether Reginald Chavis’s filing was timely as 
a matter of California law. As a result, the Supreme Court had both 
the motive and the opportunity to skew California law. 
Incorporated state law may routinely present such motive and 
opportunity: federal courts may feel the pressure of uniquely federal 
interests and if state law is unclear, they may interpret the state law in 
a way that serves federal objectives, but that is ultimately different 
than a state court would have. These two conditions can be conceived 
of as two relevant axes of consideration. Where federal interests may 
be undermined but state law is clearly established, the federal court 
may be tempted to misapply state law, but may ultimately feel 
incapable of doing so. Where federal interests are not strongly 
opposed to an accurate application of state law, and state law is either 
clear or ambiguous, a federal court is likely to approach the task of 
divining state law as it would in cases where state law applies of its 
own force. But when these conditions both exist, federal courts may 
find themselves both tempted to apply (and capable of applying) state 
law in a way that state courts would not. Incorporated state law 
therefore merits further consideration by scholars and judges. 
